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Abstract
The design and evaluation of highly reliable computer systems is a complex issue.
Designers mostly develop such systems based on prior knowledge and experience and
occasionally from analytical evaluations of simplified designs. This paper presents
a simulation-based environment called DEPEND which is especially geared for the
design and evaluation of fault-tolerant architectures. DEPEND is unique in that it
exploits the properties of object-oriented programming to provide a flexible frame-
work with which a user can rapidly model and evaluate various fault-tolerant systems.
The paper describes the key features of the DEPEND environment and illustrates its
capabilities with a detailed analysis of a real design. In particular, DEPEND is used
to simulate the Unix based Tandem Integrity fault-tolerant system 1 and evaluate how
well it copes with near-coincident errors caused by correlated and latent faults. Is-
sues such as memory scrubbing, re-integration policies and workload dependent repair
times which affect how the system handles near-coincident errors are also evaluated.
Issues such as the method used by DEPEND to simulate error latency and, the time
acceleration technique that provides enormous simulation speed up are also discussed.
Unlike any other simulation-based dependability studies, the use of these approaches
and the accuracy of the simulation model are validated by comparing the results of the
simulations with measurements obtained from fault injection experiments conducted
on a production Tandem Integrity machine.
_The MTBF figures presented in this paper should not be construed to reflect the MTBF figures of an actual
Tandem Integrity system because key parameters that have a direct bearing on this measure were not obtained from
measurements of the Integrity system but rather from other production machines. For this reason, the results shown
in this paper should only be construed to reflect the trend and behavior of a general TMR based system.
1 Introduction
The rapid growth in the demand for highly dependable systems and the increasing complemty of
these systems has made system dependability issues - availability, reliability, fault tolerance - too
important to be based on prior know-how, engineering changes and other fragmented approaches.
The classical approach of designing for performance and then addressing dependability issues and
the practice of determining a system's dependability with isolated analysis of its individual com-
ponents are no longer adequate. Since dependability is a system issue, an entire system should
be analyzed under various realistic stress conditions to determine the types of faults to which it
is especially vulnerable, to study the dynamic interactions between the components in the system
and to identify the major dependability bottlenecks.
There is a lack of automated analysis tools that facilitate such studies. This paper describes a
simulation-based environment called DEPEND that is explicitly geared for system level dependabil-
ity analysis. DEPEND is unique in that it exploits the properties of object-oriented programming
to provide a flexible framework with which a user can rapidly model and evaluate various fault-
tolerant architectures. DEPEND contains objects Which inject faults, model the behavior of system
components, compile fault statistics and perform other functions typically required for fault injec-
tion studies. These objects are general in nature and a user can customize them by specifying the
exact behavior of the components and the fault models desired. The user can then connect the
objects together to build complex simulation models with minimal effort. This approach makes
DEPEND a versatile tool that can model a wide variety of architectures 'and fault scenarios.
The capabilities and the features of DEPEND are illustrated with a simulation-based fault in-
jection study of the Tandem Integrity system - a TMR-based, fault-tolerant computer. It is well
established that this system is very effective against single faults [Jewett 91, Young 92]. An impor-
tant question is how such systems cope with near-coincident errors generally caused by correlated
failures and latent faults. Architectural issues that have a bearing on how the system handles near-
coincident faults include memory scrubbing, re-integration policies and workload dependent repair
times. To study these issues, DEPEND was used to simulate the Integrity system and evaluate
the combined effect of all these factors. This comprehensive study demonstrates the capabilities of
DEPEND in a realistic setting.
The paper focuses on the features of DEPEND used to conduct fault-injection and dependabil-
ity studies. The general design philosophy and the key aspects of DEPEND are discussed in detail.
These include the object-oriented programming environment that provides a framework for rapid
modeling, simulation of correlated and latent faults and the time acceleration technique that pro-
vides significant simulation speed up. These techniques and the simulation of the Integrity system
are validated by comparing the results of the simulations with measurements obtained from fault
injection experiments conducted on a production Integrity machine. To our knowledge, no other
simulation-based dependability study has been validated in such a fashion.
The next section presents tools and methods commonly used for dependability analysis and
it surveys simulation-based tools that have appeared recently. Section 3 describes the DEPEND
environment and illustrates the user programming interface with a very simple example. The
details of the Tandem Integrity system, the simulation model of the system and the simulation
of error latency are presented in section 4. Section 5 describes the testbed used to conduct the
injectionexperimentsonaTandemIntegritysystemandit alsopresentstheresultsthat validatethe
systemsimulationmodel.Finally,section6detailsthesimulation-basedfault injectionexperiments
conductedand the resultsobtained. Concludingremarksand an assessmentof the resultsare
presentedin section7.
2 Methods &: Tools used for Dependability Analysis
Analytical tools based on continuous time Markov chains are frequently used for dependability anal-
ysis in the early design stage. SHARPE [Sahner 87], SAVE [Goyal 86], and METASAN [Sanders 86]
are three well known analytical tools used for dependability analysis. METASAN also uses simu-
lation techniques. These tools are excellent for rapid modeling and analysis of systems and they
require very little computer processing time. Their drawback is that stringent restrictions and
simplifying assumptions are needed to keep a model analytically tractable. This makes it difficult
to model systems in detail and leads to abstractions that may not be representative of the system
being analyzed. Furthermore, analysis of certain issues such as error latency and propagation, pose
significant problems.
Fault injections, both hardware and software, is a method commonly used for dependability
analysis at the prototype stage. Studies that have used the physical insertion of faults, via hard-
ware, include fault injection experiments conducted on the FTMP (Fault Tolerant Multi-Processor)
[Lala 83], fault latency studies on the NASA AIRLAB testbed [Shin 84a], [Shin 84b], and a valida-
tion study of the computerized interlocking system for the French railways [Arlat 88]. In [Young 92],
a hybrid monitor is used to inject errors and analyze the Tandem Integrity fault-tolerant computer.
The main drawback with the proposed hardware methods is that they offer no feedback to the
system designers and are only useful as validation methods after the system has already been built.
Two tools that use software fault injection are FIAT [Segall 88] and FERRARI [Kanawati 92].
The FIAT environment utilizes software implemented fault injection to emulate various hardware
faults and is being used by the Federal Aviation Authority to validate the software system of
the Advanced Automation System. FERRARI is a similar tool which also allows the injection
of transient errors. These tools are specifically designed to inject faults into the memory space
of a program as it is executing. They have been specifically designed to evaluate and validate
application software after the software has been developed.
Simulation has greater applicability than analytical techniques and unlike the fault injection
techniques, simulation can be used in the early life cycle of a design to provide feedback to the
designer to ensure that dependability specifications are met. Various researchers have addressed
specific aspects of dependability evaluation via simulation. At the chip-level, simulation experi-
ments have been used to determine the efficiency of error-detection mechanisms [Courtois 79] and,
fault propagation [Lomelino 86]. Recently, in [Czeck 91], a simulation model of the IBM PC was
developed anti injected with gate-level transient faults. A simulation-based tool called FOCUS
[Choi 89] has been developed to investigate reliability and fault sensitivity analysis of VLSI sys-
tems. FOCUS has been used to evaluate several chip designs, including the BDX930 Bendix flight
control processor and the EC-16 Pratt/Whitney jet engine controller. These studies indicate that
simulation techniques are useful and provide insight into fault-propagation and fault-impact at the
chip-level.
At thesystemlevel,however,thereis a lackof simulation-basedependabilityevaluationtools.
l_Iostsimulation-basedtoolsaredesignedto facilitateperformanceanalysis(CSIM [Schwetman,%],
ASPOL [MacDougall 73], SES Workbench [SES 89], RESQ [Sauer 82]). VttDL [IEEE 88] is a
powerful hardware specification language but it does not contain built-in facilities to support de-
pendability analysis. To our knowledge, there is no other simulation environment like DEPEND
although some are being developed, such as NEST [Dupuy 90] and the Rainbow Net [Johnson 91].
The Rainbow Net simulator uses a petri-net like structure to model a system's behavior under fault
conditions. The model is then solved via simulation to produce typical dependability measures.
NEST is a simulation and proto-typing testbed for analyzing distributed networks and system pro-
tocols. It can fail links and nodes, but it is very specialized in the types of architectures it considers
and the types of faults it can model.
While these tools are useful in the context of their specific applications, several important issues
with regard to simulation-based, dependability evaluation of fault-tolerant systems have yet to be
addressed. These include 1) evaluating a system for long periods of time to obtain statistically valid
results, 2) providing extensive, automated fault injection environments, 3) providing facilities to
model fault tolerant components and, 4) validating simulation results with actual data. Other issues
in simulating complete systems are coordinating the injection of faults, the reactions to these faults
(e.g. aborting a process) and initiating repairs that occur simultaneously in the various components
in the system. As the system gets larger, the problem can become overwhelming. There are no
general-purpose simulation based tools that address all these issues and provide an automated
environment that makes the analysis of fanlt-tolerant systems more feasible. The development of
such a tool has been the motivation behind DEPEND.
DEPEND has been used to model the hardware and software of a distributed system employing
centralized and distributed prediction-based load sharing [Goswami 90a]. Faults were injected into
the processors and the communication channels to corrupt or destroy data used by the load sharing
software. The simulation helped to isolate a minor implementation detail of the load sharing
software that caused destructive task scheduling. This would have been difficult to detect without
simulating the software in detail and injecting faults. DEPEND is now being used to simulate the
computing element of the Hubble telescope. Various architectural configurations are being modeled
to find an optimal design that will be both reliable and yet afford the highest performance. Traces
of actual workload are being used to gauge the performability of the system under faults.
3 The DEPEND Environment
DEPEND is a joint performability and dependability analysis tool that provides a simulation frame-
work to facilitate modeling and analysis of fault-tolerant architectures at the system level (e.g.,
modeling CPUs, communication links and communication protocols). DEPEND exploits the prop-
erties of object-oriented programming to provide the framework which consists of objects that
perform simple tasks but which can be easily connected together to build complex simulation mod-
els. Some objects simulate the functional behavior 2 of components commonly used in fault-tolerant
systems. Others inject faults, compile fault statistics or generate detailed reports. Each object is
2As an example, the functional behavior of an adder is the addition operation. The gate level operation required
to do the addition is not simulated. However, there is nothing that prevents using DEPEND for lower level simulation
except for processing speed.
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self-containedand is designedto interfacewith others to createa useful,functionalmodel. For
example,an object designedto inject faults canbe connectedto an object that modelsa com-
municationlink to createanobject that cansimulatea communicationllnk under various fault
conditions. The simplicity of the objects allows them to be used in a variety of ways and yet they
are designed to be easily customizable to provide very specific functions. This makes it possible to
use DEPEND to model many different types of architectures, reconfiguration and repair schemes
and various fault scenarios.
The steps required to develop and execute a model are shown in figure 1. The user writes a
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Figure 1: Steps in developing and simulating a model with DEPEND.
control program in C++ with the objects provided by DEPEND. Once it is written, a command is
used to compile and link the program with the DEPEND objects and the run-time environment.
The model is then executed in a simulated parallel environment created by the run-time environ-
ment. Here, the assortment of objects including the fault injectors, CPUs and communication links
execute simultaneously to simulate the functional behavior of the architecture. Faults are injected
and repairs are initiated, all according to the user's specifications. When the simulation is complete,
a report containing the essential statistics of the simulation is produced.
The next subsection presents the fault models used in DEPEND. The following subsection
describes a few key DEPEND objects and the general philosophy behind their design. The pro-
gramming environment of DEPEND is illustrated with a simple example in subsection 3.3 and the
time acceleration technique used to reduce simulation execution time is described in subsection 3.4.
The approach used by DEPEND to simulate error latency is discussed in section 4.2, along with
the description of the Integrity simulation model, because it is best explained in the context of the
Tandem Integrity application.
3.1 DEPEND fault models
DEPEND was designed to handle functional fault models which simulate the system level mani-
festation of low, gate-level faults such as stuck-at faults. Functional fault models are used because
they are best suited for system level fault injection where the focus is more on the behavior of
a component rather than the exact underlying structure. DEPEND provides the mechanism for
injecting faults and relies on a 'fault subroutine' provided by the user to simulate a specific fault
model. Hence, the the generality of the types of faults injected is not limited by the tool and is
determined by the user. Default fault subroutines are provided with each DEPEND object, but
these can be overridden by the users by supplying fault subroutines of their own. The default fault
models depict the functional behavior of faults in memory and I/O subsystems, in CPUs and in
communication channels. For example, the default CPU fault model assumes that the processor
hangs when a fault is discovered. If the fault is transient, it disappears when the CPU is restarted.
If the fault is permanent, it is corrected only when the CPU is replaced. Thus this fault model
represents the functional behavior of low-level, stuck-at faults and transient errors in key CPU
registers and functional units. Similarly, for a communication medium, the functional fault model
assumes that messages are corrupted (bits in the fields of a message are flipped) or lost due to
errors. This simulates the effects of a noisy communication medium. The reaction to these faults
might trigger a re-transmission of the message. Two default fault models are available for memory
and I/O subsystems. Either a bit of a word is flipped or a flag is raised to represent the error. The
error can be detected with a byte-by-byte comparison or by checksum comparison, if the error is a
flipped bit. Otherwise, it can be detected by checking the status of the flag.
3.2 The DEPEND Object Library
DEPEND is essentially a library of objects that provide functions typically needed to model fault-
tolerant architectures and conduct system level, simulation-based dependability studies. An object
is perfect for encapsulating a set of related functions. The object library consists of a hierarchy of
elementary and complex objects. Elementary objects provide basic functions like fault injection and
the compilation of statistics. Complex objects, created with several elementary objects, perform
more complex and specific tasks. The objects were designed with four criteria in mind:
• They should make very few assumptions and should be general-purpose. For example, the
fault injector object does not assume any particular fault model.
• They should easily interface with other objects.
• They should be easy to customize and easy to use to create new objects.
• When possible, each object should provide default functionality to reduce the work done by
a user. It should be possible to override these defaults.
These criteria make it possible to simulate a wide range of architectures, and fault scenarios with
just a few key objects. These key objects model the fundamental components found in most
fault tolerant architectures. The objects model fault tolerant processors, communication channels,
memory, voters and other basic parts of a fault-tolerant computer system. As a result they can be
combined with others or replicated to build more complex systems such as self-checking systems,
N-modular redundant systems and multiprocessor systems. The rest of the subsection describes
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anobject usedto inject errorsandobjectsusedto modelprocessorsandcommunicationmediums.
Section3.3showshowthey canbeusedto createa simulationprogram.
3.2.1 Fault Injector
The primary object used to inject faults is the fault injector shown in figure 2. To use the
injector, a user specifies the fault arrival distribution and a fault subroutine that contains the fault
model and simulates the occurrence of a fault. The injector randomly samples from the specified
distribution to determine the arrival time of each fault and then calls the fault subroutine at the
appropriate times. With this approach, the fault injector is not restricted by any specific fault
model and can be used in a wide variety of ways. The injector is an elementary object that was
expressly designed to be used by more complex objects such as the server and the link (figures
3 and 4) to inject faults specific to these components. For example, the link, which simulates a
communication medium, uses the fault injector, along with a fault subroutine to corrupt and lose
messages traversing along the communication medium.
Fault Injector
Figure 2: The Fault Injector Object.
In addition to using statistical distributions to model fault arrival (see figure 2), the injector also
provides a workload-based injection scheme that varies the fault arrival rate based on a specified
workload. The user provides a workload function, a set of workload states and an exponential fault
arrival rate for each state. For example, the workload function may be the utilization of a server
or any other function that provides a measure between 0 (low workload) and 1 (high workload).
The states may be defined to consist of a high utilization state (e.g., with utilization between 0.8
to 1.0), a medium state (e.g., 0.8 to 0.4) and a low state (e.g., 0.4 to 0.0). To maintain a history of
the workload behavior, the fault injector periodically polls the workload function to update a state
transition diagram. This history is used to inject a larger number of faults during peak workload
conditions and fewer faults when the workload is low. This technique models the workload/failure
dependency observed in [Iyer 82] and [Castillo 82]. Depending on the workload function supplied
to the injector, this approach can be used to model one or a combination of workload factors.
The fault injector illustrates what we mean by "providing a simulation framework". The in-
jector provides the basic algorithms and mechanisms needed to inject faults and al]ows the user
to concentrate on the application specific aspects, the fault model and the simulation of a fault.
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Furthermore,the modular,object-orientedapproachallowsthe userto easilyexperimentwith dif-
ferent arrival distributionsand fault subroutines.Other DEPENDobjectsaresimilarly designed
to providethe functionality that arecommonlyneededwithout restrictingthe applicabilityof the
object.
3.2.2 Fault-tolerant server
The server object, which is typically used to model CPUs and other processors, is an example
of a complex object (figure 3) that is built from several elementary objects. It uses a fault injector
object to inject faults and other objects to compile and output fault statistics. The server contains
functions to simulate the acquisition, the use and the release of a server. The server offers several
service disciplines including, first come first serve (FCFS), round-robin and pre-emptive round-robin
and, it simulates contention at the server.
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Figure 3: The Fault-Tolerant Server Object.
The server offers three sparing modes: the no spare mode, the graceful degradation mode, and
the standby cold sparing mode. In the graceful degradation mode, all the spares operate on incoming
requests. The entire server fails when all the spares become faulty. In the standby sparing mode,
only the primary server operates on requests. When it fails, a reconfiguration takes place and a
healthy spare becomes the primary server. The entire server continues to function as long as there
is at least one healthy server. The number of spares and the type of sparing policy is user selected.
The server provides three fault types: permanent faults, transient faults and user defined faults.
Transient faults last for a specified period of time, after which the server returns to a healthy state
where it can be used again. When a transient or permanent fault is injected in a server, the server
becomes faulty and all requests in the queue, including the one currently using the server, are
dequeued or aborted to simulate that the processor is in a hung state. The remaining processing
time of each request is returned so that remedial action can be taken. Other fault models can
be simulated by specifying user defined faults. To simulate user defined faults, the server calls
a pre-specified fault subroutine, written by the user, that can simulate any fault action a user
requires.
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The user can customize the behavior of a server by specifying, among other things, the recon-
figuration time, repair coverage and the fault arrival rate. The user can also override the default
repair and fault behavior of the server by specifying user written subroutines to be invoked when
a fault or repair event occurs.
I PORT 1 PORT 1
°
Figure 4: The Fault-Tolerant Communication Link.
3.2.3 Fault-tolerant communication llnk
Another complex object is the link object shown in figure 4. It is designed to simulate various
types of communication links. It consists of a redundant set of communication links with redundant
connections from the links to the ports. The link is built from several objects. Several server objects
are used to model the ports and the links. An instance of the injector object is used to provide
the mechanism needed to inject faults. The rest of the link object consists of additional software
to model the behavior of a communication medium. To initialize a link object, the user specifies:
the number of redundant links and redundant connections to the links, the number of ports, the
time required to send data via the links and the types of faults to be injected. The object offers
automatic retry. Messages sent back and forth contain checksums. If a checksum error is detected
by a receiving port, a negative acknowledgment is sent triggering a retransmission of that message.
The number of retransmissions is user specified. Several fault models, including faulty link, faulty
connection, lost message and corrupted message are offered. If a link or connection is faulty or
if a message is lost, the message does not reach its destination. The sender times out waiting
for an acknowledgment and then retransmits the message. A message corruption fault flips bits
in a message based on user specifications. Like the server object, these default fault models can
be overridden by supplying user written fault subroutines. All the redundancy and fault-tolerant
features described are switch selectable so the user has a range of options and can select from a
simple link with no fault-tolerance to a Unk with all the fault-tolerance capabilities described.
Table 1 briefly describes the major objects available in DEPEND. Each object has functions
that maintain and report fault statistics, from availability and mean time between faihlres to a
detailed report on each fault injected and repair attempted. The objects in DEPEND can be
used to simulate a gamut of different architectures from hypercubes and meshes to TMR and
multiprocessor systems. The level of detail of the simulation is up to the user. For example, a node
8
Name Type Description
Active_elem Elementary Simulates a basic server.
Offers various usage disciplines:
firstcome firstserve,round robin,
pre-emptive round robin. Allows
manual faultinjectionand repair.
Injector Elementary Automatically injects faults based
on statistical distributions.
Offers worldoaA based injections.
Can inject correlated and latent faults.
Checksum Elementary Compute checksums.
Fault Reporter Elementary Compiles fault statistics. Displays
MTBF, MTBR, availability and coverage.
Can output details of every fault
injected and repair attempted.
Voter Elementary Simulates a basic voter.
Has timeout features. Default
voting scheme: byte by byte comparison.
Allows user defined voting algorithms.
RAM Complex
Link Complex
ComplexServer
Simulates a basic random access memory.
Can injectpermanent and transient
faults(bitflips)with latencies.
Simulates communication channels.
Several types of faults:link dead,
packet corruption, packet lossand
user defined faults.Automatic retry.
Simulates a server with spares.
Three sparing policies:no spare,
graceful degradation, stand-by sparing.
Automatic repair and reconflguration
with specifiedcoverage.
Automatic injectionof faults.
NMR Complex Simulates dual self-checking,
trip_e-modular redundant and N-modular
redundant components.
Fault Manager Complex Simulates software fault management
schemes. Logs faults and shuts off
components which exceed their fault threshold.
Table 1: DEPEND objects used for fault-based simulations
9
of a hypercube may be represented by a server object or, the user can use the server, link and RANI
objects to simulate the internal architecture of each node in more detail.
3.3 DEPEND's programming environment
The C++ object-oriented language is used to specify a DEPEND simulation model. The C++
language was chosen as the user interface to DEPEND for several reasons. First, a user does not
have to learn an esoteric simulation language; only knowledge of C++ is necessary. Furthermore,
the entire C++ programming environment is available to the user. DEPEND enhances C++ by
offering simulation facilities not available through regular C++ constructs. The user can use actual
C++ programs as a part of the simulation model. This makes it possible to test proto-type software
algorithms within DEPEND. C++'s strong type checking makes it easier to write large simulations
efficiently with fewer bugs than other languages such as C. Finally, C++ produces efficient code,
and the C++/UNIX environment is widely available.
Figures 5 and 6 show a simple, example program that illustrates the programming environment
and some of DEPEND's features 3. The program models two processes that communicate via a
fault-tolerant communication link. The [ink is declared in line 2 to consist of 2 links, using the
graceful degradation sparing mode. There are two ports connected to the link and each port has an
additional spare port. The co_routine 0 statement in routines main() and receiver() distinguish them
from ordinary C++ subroutines, main() and receiver() are llght-weight co-routines that execute
concurrently in a pseudo-parallel environment. Each time the co_routine() statement is executed
an instance of the co-routine is created.
The main co-routine initializes the [ink. Lines 8 through 13 specify the cost of sending a
message, the time to send acknowledgments and that automatic retry is desired. Lines 14-17
specify the percent of messages lost and corrupted and they also specify the range of bytes (from
the beginning of the message) that can be corrupted and the mask to be used. If these two types of
faults are not sufficient, the user can opt to specify his or her own fault routine by removing lines
16 and 17 and including line 18 ("//"is a C++ comment delimiter). Lines 19-22 specify the failure
rates and distributions of the ports and the links. By default, permanent faults are injected into
the ports and links because a fault type has not been specified. If transient faults or user defined
faults axe injected, repair times, coverage and user defined fault subroutines for link and port faults
can be specified.
The main co-routine creates two of the receiver() co-routines (line 26) and then goes to sleep
waiting for the event done to be set before printing the performance (e.g., throughput, response
time etc.) and fault (e.g., MTTF, availability, fault and repair times) reports. The general struc-
ture of the receiver() co-routines is shown in lines 30 through 46. Each co-routine performs some
computation, puts results in a message and then sends it to the tandem co-routine. Each co-routine
then waits for a return message, performs additional computations and repeats the entire process
until all computations are complete or until the communication link fails (i.e., both links are failed
or 1 port has failed). The last co-routine to complete wakes up the main co-routine by setting the
done event.
3The program is written in "pseudo" C++ for simplicity and ease of understanding.
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01) _define NUM 2
//Link with one spare and two ports and I spare port for each port
O2) FTAink In ("link", FT_GRACEFUL_SPARE, 1, 2, I);
03) Event done(Uevent");
04) int c_nt;
05) void main(int argc, char = argv0)
06){ co=outineC_n");
07') void recv(int);
//main control program
08) in.msg.xferr_time (10.0, 0.01);
09) In.set .f.hecksum0;
I0) In.set.Auto_retrYO;
11) In.set _aura_try(3);
12) In.set _timeout (500.0);
13) In.set -reply.xfer(10.0);
// 10 units startup, 0.01 per/byte cost
// checksum the messages
//retransmlt if there is an error
//retry 3 times before giving up
// wait S00 units for ack
// 10 units to send reply ack
14)
15)
is)
17)
18)
In.m_s.lo_(0.01);
In.msg.corrupt (0.05);
ln.set .corrupt .range(0, 6)"
In.set.,mask('2');
// ln.set -msg..fault _rune (£,my_fault Junc);
// 1% nmp lost
// 5% msgs corrupted
//corrupt any of 1st 7"bytes of msg
//XOR byte with mask = '2'
//optional, user selected fault
19)
20)
21)
22)
ln.por t _exp_inject (0.000001);
In .port.switch.time (1000.0);
In.port.swit ch_coverage (0.999);
In.set_weibJnject (x,y);
//failure rate of port
// time to switch to a spare port
//prob. switch is successful
//Weibull failure rate for links
23)
24) In.det ailed-record-on 0;In.fmject Jtart 0;
//detailed record of all injections
//start the injector
25) for (i=1 to NUM) //start processes that send and
26) receiver(i); //receive msgs at these ports
27) done.wait0; //wait for simulation to end
28) report(); //produce fault report
29) In.fault_report_full 0;
Figure 5: A simple example program using DEPEND - the main co-routine.
i1
30} void receiver(int port_ld)
31) ( co_routine("recv'); //tttls is a co-routine- not a subroutine
32) int stat, finished = 0;
33) while (!finished && ln.cond-ok0) (
34) .... do computations ...
35) .... put results into msg ...
//send( to, from, msg, size )
36) ln.send((portld+l)%NUM, port.Jd, &msg, sizeof(msg));
37) int reply = ln.receive(id, msg[id], star);
38) if (stat) {
39) ... received message without error ...
40) ... do more computation ...
41) } e_e {
42) ... message as error - take remedial action ...
43) }
}
44) cnt-;
45) if(cnt== o)
46) done.set();
}
/* optional fault routine to do specific fault injections
47) void my_fault.func(int &n_g)
48) < .... code to corrupt fields in the message ... } */
Figure 6: A simple example program using DEPEND - the "receiver" co-routine.
The simulation contains several concurrent threads of execution. There are the threads for the
main routine and the two 'receive' routines. In addition, there are several threads that inject faults
into the ports, the links and the messages traversing them.
The level of detail of the simulation model depends on the user. For example, for the computa-
tions (line 34, 35, etc.), the user may choose to simply forward the simulation clock and the data in
the messages could be arbitrary values. Alternatively, the user could execute actual code and send
real data back and forth, making it possible to test actual programs such as communication proto-
cols, algorithm-based fault-tolerant schemes [ttuang 84] and the like. Such an approach was used
to determine the fault sensitivity and fMlure behavior of two load balancing heuristics operating in
a distributed system [Goswa.mi 90a].
The simple example in figures 5 and 6 illustrates several basic features of DEPEND. DEPEND
provides the framework and the general behavior of the fault-tolerant communication link. The
specific behavior is controlled by the user by providing key parameters, specifying options and by
furnishing fault subroutines. The user is relieved from simulating the operations of the simulation
medium, the ports, the checksumming logic, the automatic retry logic and the injection of faults to
the links, ports and messages. Several methods are available to interact with the object and react to
important events such as link and port failures. The example shows two methods: a polling function
that returns the status of the link (cond_ok(), line 33) and a status variable returned by the object
(stat, line 37). In addition to various other polling functions such as functions to determine the
status of the ports, the number of messages that have been corrupted and the overhead of sending
acknowledgments, there are signals that are set any time failures and repairs occur. Co-routines
can sleep until these signals are set and then wakeup and perform specific tasks.
The example also demonstrates that the impact of different number of spares, different fault
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arrival rates and distributionsand repair coverage can be easily modeled by simply changing a
few parameters. A larger, common-bus system consisting of several ports and receiver() routines
operating on these ports can be quickly modeled by increasing the number of ports (line 2) and
appropriately increasing NUM (line 1). Distributed algorithms can be tested for correctness and to
determine their reaction to faults in the communication medium. Other architectures, such as the
hypercube, can also be modeled by creating several instances of the link object, one for each link in
the cube. By modifying the [ink declaration, a comparative performability study can be conducted
to determine whether the cold sparing or the graceful degradation sparing mode is best suited for a
particular application.
A more realistic example in which a complete fault-tolerant system is simulated with DEPEND
and injected with near-coincident errors is described in section 4.
3.4 Simulation time acceleration
Although simulation has the advantage that it can model the detailed behavior of a system, it is
bound by execution time. Simulating systems with large MTBFs can require very large execution
times because system failure is a rare event. This problem is further exacerbated because a simu-
lation must be executed several times or over a large period of time to collect enough failures to
acquire statistically valid results.
Errorn jump Errorn+l
I
,,-r/
Simulate in Simulate in
nanoseconds nanoseconds
_mo
Figure 7: Time acceleration: "Error" driven simulation.
Several techniques can be used to effectively reduce simulation time explosion. In DEPEND, a
time acceleration mechanism has been incorporated to reduce simulation execution times. Objects
in DEPEND axe designed to furnish the time of their next event. Using this feature, a list of
important events which affect dependability measures, such as the time when the next error will
arrive and when the next latent error will be activated, are kept in a chronologically sorted fist. The
simulator leaps forward to the time of the event at the head of the list and resumes processing at the
granularity of the system clock until the effect of the event has subsided (figure 7). This is different
from regular event-driven simulation because this approach allows certain user-specified "unimpor-
tant" events to be suspended during leaps while others continue. This acceleration technique is
used with the Tandem Integrity simulation described in section 4.2.
DEPEND also allows a user to implement other acceleration techniques, such as importance
sampling. Importance sampling increases the number of system failures by accelerating the failure
rates (thereby reducing the number of events that have to be simulated). It then produces unbiased
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estimatesof the dependabilitymeasureby multiplying thevaluewith a ratio that compensatesfor
theacceleratedfailurerateused[Lewis89]. DEPENDfacilitatesthe implementationof importance
samplingtechniquesbyallowingcontroloverthesimulationengineandprovidinga C++ userinter-
facewith whichuserscanincorporateimportancesamplingmethodsdirectly into their simulation
models.Importancesamplinghasbeenvery successfulin reducingsimulationtime whenthe fail-
ure and repair distributionsareexponential.In [Nicola90], the authorsextendthe applicability
of importancesamplingto non-Markoviansystemswith generalfailure and repair distributions.
But, eventhesemethodscannotbeusedto accuratelycalculatesteadystate MTTF and MTBF
measureswhenthe error occurrenceprocessis not exponential[Shahabuddin88], [Nicola90]- as
is the casein this study. However,it shouldbenoted, that the time acceleration method described
above is not a substitute for importance sampling and that it can be used in conjunction with
importance sampling to further reduce simulation time when computing dependability measures
other than the steady state MTBF or MTTF.
Another approach to reduce simulation execution time is to use hybrid simulation techniques
which combine the detailed modeling available with simulation with the efficiency of analytical
modeling (e.g., CTMC). This approach has been used on the Tandem Integrity simulations and
has been shown to provide significant reduction in simulation time [Goswami 92]. An advantage of
this approach is that it is not restricted to Markovian processes (so long as the CTMC is solved
via Monte Carlo simulation) and is therefore more widely applicable.
4 A Case Study to Illustrate DEPEND
This section illustrates the capabilities of DEPEND with a simulation-based fault injection study
of the Tandem Integrity fault tolerant computer system. This system has been shown to be very
effective against single faults. An important question is how such a system copes with near-
coincident faults generally caused by correlated failures and latent faults. Architectural issues that
have a bearing on how the system handles near-coincident errors include memory scrubbing, re-
integration policies and workload dependent repair times. To study these issues, DEPEND was
used to simulate the Integrity system and evaluate the combined effect of all these factors.
The next subsection describes the salient features of the Tandem Integrity system. The following
subsection describes the simulation model of the machine developed with DEPEND. The error
occurrence process and the techniques used to simulate error latency and speed up the simulation
are presented in the third subsection. The last subsection presents the assumptions and parameters
used in the simulation.
4.1 The Tandem Integrity Fault-Tolerant System
The Tandem Integrity fault-tolerant system [Jewett 91] was introduced in 1990. The system is
shown in figure 8. Each CPU board contains a MIPS R2000 RISC processor with an on-chip
virtual memory mechanism, 128 Kbytes of cache (64 Kbytes of instruction cache and 64 Kbytes
of data cache), a minimum of 8 Mbytes of local memory and its own separate clock. All three
processors execute the same instruction stream but due to clock drift, they do not necessarily
execute the instructions at the same time. Any time the global memory is accessed, the three
processors are synchronized and their requests are checked by the voter. The voter waits until it
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Figure 8: The Tandem Integrity processing subsystem
receives a request from each healthy processor. It then compares all three requests (the request
type, the address field and the data field, if any) for agreement and then forwards the request to
the global memory. If the processors do not access the global memory within 2047 instructions,
the voter forces them to synchronize to prevent large clock drifts. If there is a discrepancy during
voting, the processor in disagreement is shut down and the remaining processors are alerted but
continue with normal operation. The faulty processor performs a power-on self-test (POST), and
if it completes successfully it is re-integrated into the system. The re-integration process consists
of halting all the healthy processors, copying their state information and the contents of their local
memory to global memory and then copying them back again to all three processors to ensure
that all of them have identical states. Re-integration takes only 1.5 seconds for a system with 8
Mbytes of local memory. The entire process takes approximately 61.5 seconds because 60 seconds
are needed to execute the POST. The Tandem system can continue to function with one faulty
processor. However, if a second disagreement is detected by the voter before the faulty processor
is repaired, the system fails.
The local memories in the Tandem Integrity do not have parity or ECC circuitry. The system
relies on memory scrubbing to correct transient memory errors. Unlike conventional systems,
scrubbing in the Tandem Integrity system involves voting. Periodically, 64 byte portions of all
three local memories are copied to global memory. As they are copied, they are checked to see if
they are in agreement. If a disagreement is detected, the local memory's block that disagrees is
rewritten with the correct data found in the other two memories.
The boards containing the voter and the global memory are referred to as the TMRC. The
TMRC contains up to 128MB of global memory and interfaces with the CPUs via the Reliable
System Bus (RSB). The primary function of the TMRC is to vote upon the transactions sent by
15
Percent of Time
CPU is Idle
99%
59%
37%
27%
16%
Re-integration
Time
30 sec.
2 rain. 25 sec.
3 rain. 46 sec.
4 rain. and 5 sec.
4 min. and 40 sec.
0% 5 min. and 29 sec.
Table 2: Global memory re-integration times with varying machine idle percentages
the CPUs. All processor transactions that are external to the CPUs are voted on by the TMRC.
All bits of the command, address and data are voted on. The voting circuit is duplicated and
compared and any self-check errors halt the board. The global memories are protected by parity,
with one parity bit per byte of data. When a parity error is detected by the TMEC, the backup
memory takes over and prevents the primary memory from driving the KSB. A global memory is
re-integrated in the background, interleaved with ordinary processing. For a system with 32MB
of global memory, the re-integration process takes approximately 30 seconds on an idle system.
Since the re-integration time is load dependent, the re-integration time of an Tandem Integrity
with 32MB of global memory was measured under various loads. Table 2 contains the results of
these measurements. Global memory re-integration has a lower priority than CPU re-integration.
A global memory undergoing re-integration will be aborted if a CPU is ready to be re-integrated.
Once the CPU re-integration is complete, the global memory re-integration is restarted from the
beginning. The global memory, llke the local memory, is scrubbed periodically to eliminate latent
errors.
The I/O subsystem is a redundant system with two I/O processors (IOP), redundant busses
to the controllers (RIOB) and more than one controller per disk. In a healthy system, there are
always two paths to each disk. The disks can be organized as mirrored pairs so that a hot backup
is available in case a disk fails. Fault recovery for the processing core of the Tandem Integrity is a
joint hardware and software effort, but for the I/O subsystem, the software is primarily responsible
for recovery from I/O processor (IOP) and I/O controller faults. The IOP exception handler
determines if the fault is in an IOP or in a I/O controller. If it is in a controller and retries do
not succeed, the controller is shut off permanently. If the fault is in an IOP, all the I/O controllers
attached to it are switched to the remaining IOP. If the IOP has a soft-error, it is re-integrated.
Otherwise, it is logically removed from the system. The re-integration time of an IOP is less than
15 seconds. The re-integration time of the controllers varies among controllers but is typically
around 30 seconds. If a disk fails, the backup disk accepts all disk requests. Once the fault disk is
replaced, it can be mirrored on-line and takes approximately 20 minutes for a 150MB disk.
The Integrity system fails when any of the major subsystems, the processing core, the global
memory or the I/O subsystem, fails. The processing core and the global memory fails if a second
error occurs in the subsystem before recovering from an earlier error. The I/O subsystem fails
if both controllers or both IOP boards fail. In the simulation model, described next, the I/O
subsystem is also considered failed if both pairs of a mirrored disk have errors.
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4.2 The simulation model developed with DEPEND
Recall that we are interested in evaluating the Integrity system and several of its architectural fea-
tures under the stress of near-coincident errors. In order to achieve this, several key characteristics
of the Tandem Integrity system were simulated. These include:
1. the loose synchronization policy of the Integrity system. The fact that the processors idle
at the voters waiting for all three to synchronize and the exact time needed by the voting
operation are accounted for in the model.
2. the CPU (with its local memory) and the global memory structure that is unique to the
Integrity system.
3. the functional behavior of the error-detection mechanisms of the CPU and global memory
structure.
4. the CPU off-line POST and the on-line re-integration process and the global memory back-
ground re-integration process that are unique to the Tandem Integrity.
5. the behavior of the Tandem Integrity when a CPU and global memory re-integration occurs
simultaneously (prioritized re-integration).
6. the software fault management policy for the disk and I/O subsystem which logs faults and
shuts down components that receive too many faults in a short interval. Aspects of the
management policy such as the specific number of faults that must arrive before a component
is shutdown are proprietary. We use realistic values based on the error arrival rates.
The details of the system architecture and how it reacts to faults were determined by studying its
layouts, descriptions and manuals, discussing the matter with its designers and conducting several
fault injection studies (in addition to the validation experiments mentioned below). Simultaneous
injections into various components of the system helped to uncover interesting characteristics of the
system that were subsequently incorporated into the Integrity simulation model. The simulation
model of the Tandem Integrity, developed with DEPEND, is shown in figure 9. The blocks on the
right axe the DEPEND objects used in the simulation model. The block on the left summarizes
the program written to create the simulation model and control the operations of each of the "
components.
The NMR object in the DEPEND library is the primary object used to develop the simulation
model. It is used to model the NMR processing core and the dual, self-checking global memory.
The NMR object simulates dual self-checking, triple-modulax redundant and N-modulax redundant
systems. It contains two, three or more servers and one voter. The servers are designed to idle until
they receive a task to process. They then execute for the time period specified and feed their results
to the voter. The voter waits for the servers to deposit their results and then executes a voting
algorithm to detect discrepancies in the results. The voter uses a timeout condition to prevent
hanging in cases where a server fails to report to the voter. The NMR object offers two voting
algorithms: bit stream voting and error based voting. The bit stream voting scheme performs a bit
by bit comparison of the data deposited by the servers. The error based algorithm flags a server's
result as being faulty if an active error (see below) has been injected into the server. This option
was used in the simulations because the processors were not given any real data to process. In
addition to these voting schemes, the NMR object also allows the voting algorithm to be specified
by the user. Once the voting is complete, the NMR automatically shuts down the servers with
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Figure 9: The simulation model of the Tandem Integrity system developed with DEPEND.
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faulty results.The NMR doesnot offerautomaticrepairschemes.However,it hasfunctionsthat
canbe calledto repair the individual servers.This featureis usedto simulatethe automaticre-
integrationfeatureof theTandemIntegrity. TheNMI_object'sfault injector isusedto injectlatent
andcorrelatederrors.Thedetailsof theerrorinjectionprocessarediscussedin the nextsubsection.
The processing core wassimulatedwith a NMR.object containing3 servers. Eachserver
simulatesa processorboardcontainingaCPUandalocalmemory.TheNMR's injectiontechnique
is usedto inject errorsinto both the processorandthe localmemory.
Thetwoglobal memory boardsaresimulatedwith a NMR with 2 servers.Every2047cycles,
whenthe processorsynchronize,the global memory'serror based voting function is explicitly
invoked by the control program to check each server and shut down any that has an active error.
This simulates the actual operation of the Integrity system because parity errors in the global
memory are detected when the processors synchronize at the voter to access global memory.
The fault manager object was used to simulate the reliability aspects of the I/O subsystem
because it closely models the software controlled recovery process used with the Tandem Integrity's
I/O subsystem. The fault manager object is primarily used to mimic typical software fault man-
agement schemes which log faults against components and shut down components that receive a
large number of faults in a short time interval. Each component has a fault threshold. Periodi-
cally, faults logged against the component are erased so that only a burst of faults can exceed the
threshold. To setup the fault manger, the user specifies: the number of components, the number
of elements in each component and the number of faults that can arrive in a specified period of
time without causing the element to be shutdown (fault threshold). The user can opt to apportion
faults to the components probabillstically or can specify the component with each fault injected.
The user can select automatic repair and the re-integration time required for each component. To
simulate the I/O subsystem of the Tandem Integrity, an instance of the Fault Manager object was
created with components to simulate the IOP, the controller and the three mirrored disks. The
IOP and controller were each modeled with one component containing two elements. The mirrored
disk was modeled with two components with each containing three elements. Once component was
used to log soft errors such as errors from bad blocks. The other was used to log hard errors such
as a major catastrophe that affects the entire disk and causes disk mirroring to be lost. The fault
threshold for the IOP was set at 1, for the controller it was 4, for soft disk errors 8, and 1 for hard
disk errors. The fault eraser was specified to wake up hourly and erase an error (if one was logged)
in all healthy elements. These specifications for the I/O subsystem are not those of the Tandem
Integrity system. Detailed information about the software error management scheme of the system
was not available.
The control program in figure 9 declares instances of the three DEPEND objects and ini-
tializes and customizes them in a similar way to that shown in figure 5. Initialization consists of
specifying the error arrival distribution desired, the error arrival rate, the error latency, the number
of components and their re-integration times and so on. After initialization, the program "starts"
each object causing it to automatically perform tasks based on the parameters specified during
initialization. For example, when the fault manager object is started, it will automatically inject
faults, perform repairs and erase faults until the I/O subsystem fails. All actions are automatically
logged and the user can call functions to obtain a detailed report of every fault or repair. In addi-
tion, statistics such as availability, MTBF, the number of faults injected, the mean time between
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repairandthe repaircoverageareavailable.
After starting the objects,thecontrolprogramloopsfor a specifiednumberof simulatedyears
exercisingthe machine.Theprogramrequeststheprocessorsto execute2047instructionsandthen
synchronizeat the voter. The controlprogramthensleepsuntil voting is completedand then it
checksto seeif anyprocessorhasbeenshutdownby the voter. If so,a POSTcycleis initiated for
the faulty processor.The control programthen polls the global memoryboardsto determineif
thereareanydetectederrors.If a boardhasanerror,are-integrationprocessis started. Next, the
control programchecksto seeif the entire systemhasfailed and if so it initiates a rebootof the
systemthat resetsall the subsystems.If the systemhasnot failed,the controlprogramdetermines
if thereis a processorthat hascompleteda POST(that wasinitiated at an earlier time) andis
readyfor re-integration. If so, anyglobal memoryre-integrationthat is in progressis aborted,
and the systemsimulatesthe re-integrationprocessof a processorby halting the systemfor 1.5
seconds.Afterwardsanyglobalmemoryre-integrationprocessthat wasabortedis restartedfrom
the beginning.Finally the time acceleration algorithm, described earlier, is invoked to determine
the time of the next major event. The clock is advanced to that time and the whole cycle repeats.
The control program does not explicitly check for faulty I/O components. The fault manager
object conducts automatic re-integration of failed elements and interrupts the control program
whenever the entire I/O subsystem fails. The I/O subsystem fails if an entire component (e.g.
both IOPs, both controllers or a mirrored disk pair) fails.
To summarize, this subsection describes the DEPEND objects and shows how they are used to
simulate the Tandem Integrity system. The bulk of the simulation is performed by the DEPEND
objects. All the statistics compilation, fault injection and repair actions are done by DEPEND. As
a result, only a small control program needs to be written by the user. This makes it possible to
simulate large systems with relatively little effort. Since the control program is small, it is easy to
compile, debug and verify.
4.3 The Error occurrence process, Time acceleration & Experiment design
The simulation models errors in the storage elements (e.g. registers and memory) of the system.
These errors are assumed to be caused by transient faults such as ionization radiation and are
assumed to manifest as a single bit flip that can be detected by the voter if it is in the processor
board, or detected by the parity error coding scheme if it is in the global memory. Compensating
second errors to the same bit are not considered because it is a very rare event.
The TMR's fault injector is used to inject active, latent and correlated errors. Active errors are
detected within 2047 cycles from the time they are injected. Latent errors may remain dormant for
hours before being detected. As a result, a component may have several latent errors. This models
the phenomenon observed when errors were injected into the Integrity system; errors injected into
the section of a local memory containing the exception handler, the TLB (Translation Lookaside
Buffer) miss handler or the processor register space were usually detected immediately whereas
errors injected into other locations in the local or global memories had a much larger latency. A
correlated error is two or more errors injected simultaneously into two or more components of a
subsystem. Each correlated error can be either active or latent. This notion that the correlated
errors may have different latencies is justifiable because there is a high probability that the errors
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will not occur in the samelocationin eachcomponentandhencewill producedifferentlatencies.
Evenif the errorsoccurin the samelocation, the latenciesarestill likely to be different because
the processors are loosely synchronized.
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Figure 10: The error occurrence process simulated with DEPEND.
The complete error occurrence process for just two CPUs is illustrated in figure 10. A similar
process is used to inject errors into the global memory with one exception; only latent errors are
injected. As shown in the figure, the error arrival times are exponentially distributed. When
an error is injected, a probabilistic branch is used to determine whether it is a correlated error
affecting 2 or more components in a subsystem, or a single error. A probabilistic branch is also
used to determine whether the error is active or latent. Eventually, the error is detected by the
voter and the component is shutdown and then re-integrated. The next subsection describes how
error latency is simulated.
4.3.1 Simulating error latency
One way to simulate error latency is to model a memory structure and the read and write
access to the words in the memory. Error latency is then the time from the corruption of a word
to the time it is read. An excellent description of such an approach can be found in [Meyer 88].
The drawback with this approach is that in order to reduce execution time, several simplifying
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assumptionssuchasgeometricalaccesstime distribution, independenceof memoryaccessesand
simple,static read/write accessdistributionsneedto beassumed.
While sucha modelcanbe usedin DEPEND,a simplerapproach,whichallowsthe user to
directlyspecifythe latencydistribution, is alsoincorporatedinto DEPEND.In section5, weshow
chat this simpler approach is indeed yard and representative of system behavior. When the NMR
object injects a latent error, it determines its latency from a statistical or empirical distribution.
Based on this latency time, the error is inserted into a dormant queue in chronological order. The
errors are extracted from the queue when their latency times have expired and are then placed on
a list of active, detectable errors (see figure 10). This approach has several advantages. First, it
makes no assumptions about the structure of the component injected and so the basic mechanism
can be used to simulate error latency in CPU registers, memory boards, caches and other structures
also. The latency distribution represents and contains the structural and functional differences of
the various components. This is useful to DEPEND because it strives for methods that are general
and widely applicable. Second, because this approach uses a distribution and does not require
detailed modeling of the memory structure, it can potentially be represented with an analytical
continuous time Markov chain (CTMC). Finally, and the biggest advantage of this approach is that
it results in enormous simulation speed up because the time at which the next latent error will
become detectable is known thus eliminating the need to simulate the system between occurrences
of detectable errors. The time acceleration algorithm described in section 3.4 takes advantage of
this property.
4.3.2 Assumptions and parameters used in the simulations
Error arrival times are assumed to be exponentially distributed. The distribution means are
based on findings from a measurement-based analysis of real error data collected from a DEC
VAXcluster multicomputer system[Tang 90]. Tang found that the mean time between CPU errors
(1/,,kcPu) in the system was 265.8 hours with a standard deviation of 497.6 hours. The mean time
between memory errors (1/,,kMemory) was 27.0 hours with a standard deviation of 150.4 hours. The
combined error arrival rate is approximately 1 every 24 hours. Of this combined rate, approximately
62% of the errors are injected into the global memory and 38% are injected into the processor
board containing the CPUs and the local memories. These numbers are based on the size of the
memories (8Mbytes of local memory per board and 32Mbytes of global memory per board) and the
contribution of the CPU error arrival rate to the combined error arrival rate. The voter is assumed
to be error free. To compensate for the fact that the measurements are from a larger system and
that the standard deviations are large relative to their means, three combined error arrival rates
(shown in Table 5) are used in the simulations. Still, one cannot assert that the error rate of the
Tandem Integrity is similar to that of the VAX cluster. Since we are not concerned with absolute
reliability figures but rather with the trends and changes to system reliability due to various fault
conditions, this does not pose a problem.
The error latencies used in the simulations are based on findings from a measurement study
of the VAX 11/780 by Chillarege [Chillarege 87]. Chillarege found that error latency is workload
dependent. Errors injected at midnight, when the workload was low, had a mean latency of 8 hours
with a standard deviation of approximately 4 hours. Errors injected at noon, when the machine
was used heavily, had a mean latency of approximately 44 minutes and a standard deviation of 29
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minutes.Theerror latenciesusedin this studyareapproximatedby normaldistributionswith the
meansand standarddeviationsjust mentioned.A larger latencywith a meanof 36hoursand a
standarddeviationof 18hoursis alsousedin the simulationsto determinethe effectof extremely
largelatencies.
All errors,includingundetectedlatenterrors,residingin a processoror in a globalmemoryare
assumedto becorrectedwhenthe componentundergoesa re-integration,the systemis rebooted
or whenscrubbingtakesplace- regardlessof the numberof latent errorsresidingin the system.
Therefore,not all theerrorsinjectedaredetectedandtheactualerrorarrivaldistributionof detected
errors depends on the scrubbing rate, the component re-integration rate, the error latency and
the injection rate. Because error latencies and global memory re-integration times are workload
dependent, various system workloads are implicitly modeled by varying these parameters. Finally,
since we are primarily concerned with transient errors, permanent errors are not injected and the
MTBFs presented do not reflect their impact on system reliability.
5 Validation of the Simulation Model
Many steps were taken to ensure that the simulation model of the Tandem Integrity adequately
represents the behavior of the actual machine under error conditions. The Tandem Integrity's
response to errors was determined by discussing the matter with its designers and by injecting
errors into multiple components of an Integrity system, observing the interactions and incorporating
them into the simulation model. For example, the prioritized re-integration policy, where a global
memory re-integration is aborted to conduct a CPU re-integration, was only discovered when
errors were simultaneously injected into the global memory and a CPU. To further verify the
abstractions used to simulate the injection process and the system's behavior, an additional set of
injection experiments were conducted and the results were compared with those obtained from the
simulation. This section describes these injection experiments in detail.
Specifically, the goal of the experiments was to verify whether the simulation model is correct
and detailed enough to capture the behavior of the Integrity system, especially under latent errors.
We also determined if a single latency distribution was sufficient to model the workload and the
dynamically changing user and system activity.
The experimental testbed takes advantage of the Integrity system's ability to re-integrate a
failed component of a subsystem on-the-fly without crashing the system. The testbed was designed
to repeatedly injected errors into one CPU board and collect measurements. The Integrity system's
on-line re-integration also made it possible to automate the injection process and run the injection
experiments continuously for several days while other users continued to use the system, unaffected.
This made it possible to collect data under varying load conditions and to collect enough data to
provide statistically valid comparisons. The next subsection describes the validation testbed and
the injection process. The following subsection describes the validation experiments conducted.
Finally, results of the experiments are presented in the third subsection.
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5.1 Validation environment: Hybrid monitoring
A hybrid monitoring environment was used to conduct the injection experiments. Figure 11 shows
the various parts of the environment. A Tektronix DAS 9200 digital logic analyzer was used to
monitor bus activity on one CPU (the CPU that is injected with errors) of the Integrity system.
The logic analyzer contains a finite state machine that was programmed to collect pertinent data
such as the times when an injection occurs, an exception is raised by the Tandem Integrity and when
POST is initiated. In addition, the types of exceptions raised and the times when the corrupted
word are accessed (read and written) are also collected.
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Figure 11: An injection environment using hybrid monitoring.
The logic analyzer is controlled by a DAS control program that runs on a Sun SparclI work-
station. The control program accepts commands from the injection program and translates them
into a sequence of DAS recognizable commands that start and stop the DAS and upload the data
collected by the DAS. The injection program runs on the Tandem Integrity machine and injects
errors into the text region (the region containing the machine instructions) of a process. It also
controls the operations of the DAS remotely via the DAS control program. The specific injection
programs used in the experiments are described in the next subsection. An error is injected by
corrupting a bit in a word that is randomly selected from the text region of the target applications
and writing that word into the memory of one CPU (in this case, CPUB). If the word resides in
the cache, it is deleted to ensure that the corrupted version of the word is used.
An acceleration technique was used to increase the percent of errors detected. An executable
version of a program consists of a large prologue, epilogue and support code in addition to the main
body of the program. Because the prologue and epilogue mostly contain code used to initiate and
terminate a program and perform other support functions, and were infrequently invoked during
the execution of the target applications, only the machine instructions in the main body of the
program were injected. This increased the percent of errors detected from approximately 10% to
65%. This acceleration technique may reduce the error latency values measured but our objective
is validation and not error latency measurement.
The target applications are Gaussian elimination programs which use a random number gener-
ator to fill a square matrix and then execute the Ganssian elimination algorithm to solve the set of
simultaneous equations. This process is repeated indefinitely. Two instances of the program were
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executedsimultaneouslyandinjectedwith errors.The programsgeneratedandsolved300-by-300
elementmatrices.
5.1.1 The Validation Experiments
The validation was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, a contro/led experiment was
conducted to determine the error latency distribution, the error isolation distribution and the
percent of errors detected. For these experiments, the error latency distribution is defined to be the
time from injection to the time an exception is raised by the Tandem Integrity. The error isolation
distribution is the time from the exception to the time when power-on-self-test (POST) of the CPU
board is initiated. These values are subsequently input to the system simulation. The injection
program used is shown in figure 12. The three minute wait time used in the injection program was
1) Start the two Gaussian elimination workload programs.
2) Start the DAS controller and request it to start the DAS.
3) Randomly select
the program to inject
the address of the word to be corrupted
the mask to use.
4) Inform the DAS of the address of the word corrupted.
5) Inject the error into the word (flip a sigle bit).
6) Wait for CPU shutdown or 3 minutes - whichever comes first.
meanwhile, the DAS looks for exceptions, POST etc.
7) If the CPU was not shutdown
shutdown the CPU.
8) Initiate the POST and re-integration process.
t_8 cleamJ out amy effect of the Jz_ject_on.
9) Request the DAS controller to upload the data collected by the DAS.
10) Goto step 3.
Figure 12: Injection program used for phase 1 of the validation experiment.
determined through experimentation to be sufficiently long enough so that the probability of an
error being detected three minutes after the injection is negligible. Examples of errors that are not
detected include errors injected into machine instructions that axe never or rarely executed (e.g.,
an if clause that is never true) and flipping bits in an unused portion of an instruction word. This
phase of the experiment is referred to as a 'controlled' experiment because only one error is injected
at a time and the system is always reset to a known state before injecting the next error (step 8 in
figure 12).
The purpose of the second phase of the experiment was to collect the CPU shutdown distribution
and the distribution of the number of undetected, latent errors present in the CPU board prior
to a shutdown 4. These distributions are then compared with those generated with the DEPEND
Integrity simulation model. The second phase of the experiment was an 'uncontrolled' experiment
in which errors were injected randomly without waiting to determine the effect of the previous errors
injected and without returning the system to a known state before each injection. Errors arrived
based on an exponential distribution with a mean of 3 minutes. Such an accelerated rate was used
4This is simply a count of the number of errors injected prior to a CPU shutdown. So if four errors are injected
before a shutdown, it is assumed that there are three undetected errors in the CPU prior to a shutdown.
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to ensurethat enoughCPUshutdowneventswouldbecollectedfor a meaningfulcomparisonwith
the simulationresults.The injectionprogramusedis shownin figure13.
1) Start the two Caussian elimination workload programs.
2) Start the DAS controller and request it to start the DAS.
3) Randomly select
the program to inject
the address of the word to be corrupted
the mask to use.
4) Inform the DAS of the address of the word corrupted.
5) Inject the error into the word (flip a single bit).
6) Determine time of next error, t (exp(A -- 3minutes)).
7) Wait for CPU shutdown or until t - whichever comes first.
8) If (CPU is shutdown before t elapses)
re-integrate the CPU
sleep until t elapses
9) Goto step 3.
Figure 13: Injection program used for phase 2 of the validation experiment.
A summary of both phases of the experiment is shown in table 3. In the first phase, 734 errors
Phase
Phase 1
Phase 2
Duration (hrs.) No. Injections No. CPU Shutdowns
93.5 734 476
28.0 414 247
Table 3: Validation experiment statistics.
were injected continuously over a period exceeding three days (93.5 hours). During this period,
other users continued to use the Integrity system. As a result, the workload was not fixed and
varied with the number of users and the time of day. The errors, however, were only injected
into the two target applications. The second phase of the experiment was conducted under similar
conditions and lasted for 28 hours, during which 414 errors were injected.
5.1.2 Results from Phase 1: Measurement of Error Latency
The error latency and isolation latency distributions measured from the first injection experi-
ment is shown in figure 14. The mean error latency was found to be 16.48 seconds for 300-by-300
element matrices. The mean latency was found to vary considerably depending on the size on the
matrices. With 15-by-15 matrices, the mean latency was approximately 1 second.
Non-linear regression techniques from a statistical analysis package [SAS], were used to fit the
empirical distributions with common exponential polynomials. The fitted functions are also shown
in figure 14 and their parameters and an indication of the goodness of fit (the r 2 value) are given
in table 4. Both a 2-phase hyperexponential and an exponential distribution were fitted to the
empirical error latency distribution. The figure shows that the hyperexponential distribution is
a reasonably good fit and approximates the percent of small and large error latencies well. The
exponential distribution overestimates the number of small latent errors and underestimates the
number of large latent errors. The isolation distribution, the time from the first exception to
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Figure 14: Measurements from the first injection experiment.
Error Latency
Type Parameters r 2
2-phase al = 0.5, a2 = 0.5 0.89
hyperexponent!al )`1 = 0.03,)`2 = 5.94
exponential )` = 0.5257 0.819
Error Isolation
Type Parameter r 2
2-phase ),1 = 16.32 0.55
hypoexponential )`2 = 16.36
4-phase )`1 = 34.93, )`2 = 31.26 0.67
hypoexponential )`3 = 54.66, )`4 = 34.13
Table 4: The fitted exponential polynomials.
the time POST is initiated, has an unusually large peak which makes it difficult to fit. The
distribution has a peak that indicates that a majority of the errors are isolated within 0.1125
seconds followed by a large tail which represents those infrequent cases that take more time. As
discussed in [Geist 90], similar behavior has been observed by several experimenters, including
[Finelli 87] and [McGough 83]. The empirical isolation distribution was fitted with a 2-stage and
a 4-stage hypoexponential distribution. Both fail to capture the peak and indicates that a mixed
distribution may be needed for a better fit [Geist 90 I. However, since the isolation distribution is
a small fraction of the total error latency, the total latency being the sum of error latency and
isolation latency, additional effort to find a proper fit was abandoned. Instead, the simpler 2-stage
hypoexponential distribution was used in the simulations and found to produce adequate results.
5.1.3 Results from Phase 2: Comparison of Simulation and Actual Injection Results
The fitted hyperexponential error latency and the 2-stage hypoexponential isolation latency dis-
tributions obtained from phase 1 of the experiment were used in the DEPEND Integrity simulation
model to represent the total error latency of the injected errors. The system simulation was modi-
fied to only inject errors into one CPU. The simulation injection scenario used was identical to that
outlined in figure 13. The model was executed for a simulated time period of 500,000 seconds (5.78
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days)with anexponentialerror arrival rate with a meanof 3 minutes.Figure15showsthe mea-
suredand simulatedCPUshutdowndistributionsand their means,medians,standarddeviations
andthe samplecounts.Themeans,mediansandthe standarddeviationsarestatisticallyidentical.
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Figure 15: The Time to CPU shutdown distribution(inseconds).
Comparing the distributions,the generalshape ofboth distributionsissimilarin spiteof the fact
that the measured distributionhas 5 times fewer samples. A closerlook at the two distributions
revealthat many of the peaks in the measured distributioncan alsobe found in the distribution
obtained from simulation.For example, the simulateddistributioncapturesthe peaks which occur
between 640 and 960 seconds and between 960 and 1280 seconds. The simulationmodel was also
executed with the fittedexponentiallatencydistribution(seetable4) and found to produce a mean
time of368.3 seconds between CPU shutdowns. The mean time issmallerbecause the fittedexpo-
nentialerrorlatencydistributionoverestimatesthe number of errorswith small latencies.Figure
16 containsthe measured and simulateddistributionsofthe number of undetected,latenterrorsin
the CPU at the time of a shutdown. The distributionobtained from the simulationmodel tracks
the one obtained from measurement very well.
These resultsdemonstrate that the simulationmodel of the Integritysystem isvalidand that
DEPEND iscapable of capturingthe intricaciesofa realsystem. The resultsalsoindicatethat a
singleerrorlatencydistributioncan be used to representthe dynamically changing system activity
and workload so that accuratedependabilitymeasures can be obtained.The distributionin figure
15a was obtained from an actualmachine over a period of 28 hours while severalusersused the
system,the workload changed with the time ofday and paging,swapping and othersystem activities
continuedundeterred.The distributionshown infigure15b was obtainedfrom the simulationmodel
in which allof the system activitywas replacedby a singlelatencydistribution.The statistically
identicalparameters of the CPU shutdown distributionsand theirsimilarshapes indicatethat
modeling system activityand memory read/write accessmay be eliminatedand replaced with
a latency distributionfor the purpose of obtainingdependabilitymeasures. This simplification
makes itpossibletomodel largersystems forextended periodsof time without sacrificingaccuracy.
Furthermore, in caseswhere the latencycan be fittedwith an exponentialpolynomial,itmay be
possibleto model the errorlatencyprocesswith analyticaltechniques.
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Figure 16: Distribution of the number of latent errors prior to a CPU shutdown.
6 Simulation-based Fault Injection Study
Having verified the simulation model, it is now used to analyze the behavior of the TMR-based
system under correlated and latent errors and with memory scrubbing and various re-integration
times. These experiments illustrate some of the capabilities of DEPEND and the sorts of analysis
that is possible with such a tool. The parameters used in the simulation experiments are listed
in table 5 s. The experiments were conducted in phases to isolate and determine the impact these
various parameters have on system reliability. The system was simulated for time periods ranging
from 30 years to 2000 years. Each simulation was run twenty times with different random seeds
and the averages of these repeated executions are shown here.
Except where explicitly stated, the simulations were executed with a POST time of 60 seconds,
a global memory re-integration time of 2 minutes and with memory scrubbing turned off..The
mean time between failures (MTBF) is calculated by dividing the simulation period by the average
number of system failures. The MTBF figures presented in this paper should not be construed to
reflect the MTBF figures of an actual Tandem Integrity system because the error arrival rate and the
error latency, which have a direct bearing on this measure, were not obtained from measurements
of the Tandem Integrity system but rather from other production machines. For this reason, the
results shown in this paper should only be construed to reflect the trend and behavior of a Tandem
Integrity like machine.
6.1 Impact of Correlated Errors
TMtt systems have been shown to be extremely effective against single, independent errors. In
this experiment, correlated errors are injected to determine their impact on system reliability. To
isolate the impact of correlated errors, only active errors are injected. Correlation factors of 0, 1
5Normally distributed error latencies based on [Chillarege 87] are used because they were collected over large
periods of time whereas our latency measurements were for validation and were obtained under high acceleration
conditions. Nevertheless, DEPEND can use both, as has been established.
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Error Arrival Ra_e At [ 1/24 hrs
Error Arrival Rate A2 [
IError Arrival Rate M
Small Latency (sm)
Large Latency (lg)
Extra Large Latency (x])
Percent Correlated Errors
1/72 hrs
1/120 hrs
mean = 44 min. std = 29 min.
mean ----8 hrs. std = 4 hrs.
mean -- 36 hrs. std --- 18 hrs.
0, 1, 2
Percent Latent errors 85
POST Time 1, 10, 30, 60 sec.
CPU Re-integration 1.5 sec.
Global Mem. Re-integration 0.5, 2, 5, I0 rain.
IOP Re-integration 15 sec.
Controller Re-integration 30 see.
Recoveryfrom bad block 30 sec.
Disk Mirroring time (150 MB)
System Reboot time
20 rain.
10 min.
I/O Error Arrival Intervals 5,8,12,15,18,21,24,27,48,72,96 hours
Table 5: Simulation parameters.
and 2 percent were used. Figure 17 shows the results for error arrival rates A1 and A2 for various
global memory re-integration times. The figure shows that there is a significant reduction in the
MTBF when correlated errors axe injected. However, because only active errors are injected, all
errors injected are detected and all occurrences of correlated errors result in a system failure.
a) Active Errors, AI arrivalrate b) Active Errors, A2 arrivalrate
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Figure 17: Active errors (no latency) with various global memory re-int, times
These results are therefore very pessimistic. Latency tends to decrease the probability of two errors
occurring simultaneously and reduces the degradation caused by correlation. The next subsection
presents results when latent correlated errors are injected.
The figures also illustrate the degradation in reliability as the global memory re-integration time
is increased. Increasing the re-integration time from 30 seconds to 5 minutes (a 10-fold increase)
3O
reduces the MTBF by a factor of 5 for ,_2. The results demonstrate that the MTBF for a TMR
system is quite sensitive to the re-integration times. Since the global memory re-integration times
for the Integrity system increases with increasing workload, the system reliability will be much
lower if the machine is heavily used. To avoid this, the priority of the background re-integration
process can be increased to ensure that it always takes approximately 30 seconds (for 32Mbyte
boards) and is workload independent. Whether the performance cost is acceptable will depend on
the use of the $2. If the Integrity system is used as a part of a cash station system, a 30 second
glitch may be acceptable whereas it may be problematic for a manufacturing system. Finally, since
the re-integration times also depend on the size of the memory, larger systems will have smaller
MTBFs.
The performance overhead for voting was also measured during the experiments and was found
to be 3.36% with the assumptions that the processors only vote every 2047 cycles and that they
all arrive at the voter at the same time. This is the minimum voting overhead because in actual
operation, the CPUs are likely to vote more often (i.e., they vote whenever they access global
memory or perform I/O) and they will typically never reach the voter at the same time, leaving
the early comers to idle waiting for the slowest processor.
Three different re-integration policies: 1) the CPU has priority and aborts global memory re-
integration in progress, 2) global memory re-integration has priority and aborts CPU re-integration
in progress, 3) and both have equal priority, were simulated and found not to have any significant
impact on system MTBF. This is because the probability of simultaneous re-integrations by a CPU
and a global memory was extremely small and hence all three policies behaved identically.
6.2 Impact of Latent and Correlated Errors
Since in reality errors have latency, the experiments above are repeated except this time correlated,
latent errors axe injected. All errors injected into the global memory have latency. Eighty-five
percent of the errors injected in the CPU boards have latency and the remaining 15% are active
errors. Since 2 or 3 correlated active errors _ always cause the system to fail, the maximum
system MTBF attainable under these error conditions can be approximated by multiplying the
probability of injecting 2 or 3 active correlated errors with the error arrival rate of the processor
subsystem. Using the equations in the appendix, the approximate maximum MTBF for A1 is 8.66
years and for A2 is 25.98 years for a correlation factor of 2%.
Figure I8 graphs the change in the MTBF for error arrival rates of ,_1 and )_2. Scrubbing was
not activated and a POST time of 60 seconds and a global memory re-integration time of 2 minutes
was used. There are three things worth noting. First, the figure shows that the degradation
in the MTBF when correlated latent errors are injected is not as significant as when correlated
errors with no latency are injected. For example, for ,_2, with 1% correlated errors and small
latency, the degradation in the MTBF is 5-fold, whereas the degradation is over 80-fold when the
errors have no latency. These results indicate that error latency tends to counteract the effect
of correlated errors. This is because latent errors remain dormant for some period of time and
reduce the probability of their simultaneous detection. Similar trends were observed for the other
error arrival rates. Second, the MTBF values in the graph are all less than the maximum MTBF
calculated above. This indicates that correlated active errors are not the sole cause of all the system
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Figure 18: Combination of correlatedand latenterrors,Mem. re-int= 2 rain.,no scrubbing.
crashesand that correlatedlatenterrorsalsoimpair system reliability.This isalsoborne out by
figure19 which shows thatthe number of times the entireglobalmemory subsystem failsincreases
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Figure 19: Number of Processor subsystem and Global Memory subsystem failures. No scrubbing.
with increasing correlation. Since no active errors are injected into the global memory, only the
increase in correlated, latent errors can account for the increase. Similarly, the number of processor
subsystem failures would have been identical for all latencies if correlated latent errors did not
contribute to the failures (figure 19b).
6.3 Error Injection with Scrubbing
In this experiment, memory scrubbing is activated to see how well it protects the system from
correlated, latent errors. Four scrubbing intervals, 1 hour, 4 hours, 8 hours and 24 hours, are used.
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Figure 20 shows the impact of scrubbing on the system MTBF for the various scrubbing intervals
for the three latencies with error arrival rate A1. The case where scrubbing is not used (scrubbing
interval = 0 in the figure) is also included in the graphs for comparison purposes. Figure 20a
a) Impact of Scrubbing, A1 c) Impact of Correlation on Hourly Scrubbing, A1
M
T
B
F
Y
r
s
60-
50-
40-
30-
2 -
10-
0 i i l
014 8
sm
×
i
24
M
T
B
F
y
r
$
60-
50"
40-
30-
20
1°°
0
I
2
sm
b) d)
M
T
B
F
2000
1500
I000
500
I
I
I
I
/<.................. xxl
k
\
'x--
........ -_.lg] I I
8 24
M
T
B
F
2000
1500
1000
500
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
-- \
\
\
lg
........ X1
\
\
\
\
\
1
0
014 0 2
Scrubbing interval Percent Correlation
Figure 20: Results with scrubbing activated. POST = 60s. Global Mem. Re-int. = 2 min.
shows that with small latency ( mean of 44 minutes) frequent scrubbing is necessary. With hourly
scrubbing, the MTBF increases nearly 7 times over the non-scrubbing case. When the scrubbing
frequency is decreased to once in 4 hours, there is only a 1.5 times increase in the MTBF. For larger
latencies, scrubbing every 8 hours or just once a day provides good results as seen in figure 20b.
Identical trends were seen for the other error arrival rates. The results indicate that the scrubbing
frequency should be based on the size of the expected latency and not on the error arrival rate.
Here again there is a performance/reliabillty tradeoff because latency decreases with increasing
workload and that is precisely when frequent scrubbing is required. Fortunately, the overhead for
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scrubbing is not significant. The overhead for scrubbing the global memory and the local memory
hourly was only 0.34% of the processing time.
Figure 20c and 20d show that the improvement in system reliabi]_ity achieved by scrubbing
diminishes substantially when there are correlated errors. For example, with 1% correlated, small
latent errors, the MTBF falls from 52.03 years to 8.4 years. Though scrubbing is not effective
against correlated errors, the experiments revealed that it still tends to decrease the number of
near-coincident faults and increase the availability of the individual components.
6.4 Impact of POST Time
The system simulated is designed to tolerate single faults. For such systems, the time needed to
repair a faulty component is referred to as its window of vulnerability. If a second fault arrives
within this window, the system will fail. The previous experiments show that the MTBF of the
system is quite sensitive to the size of this window and so in this experiment we simulate the
Integrity system with various CPU POST and global memory re-integration times to determine
which of these repair times have the greatest impact on system reliability.
So far all experiments have been conducted with a 61.5 second CPU repair time; 60 seconds to
perform a power-on self-test (POST) and 1.5 seconds to re-integrate the CPU. The re-integration
time cannot be reduced but the POST time canbe cut by using different self-checking programs.
Since most errors axe caused by transient faults, an effective policy may be to perform only a
perfunctory check that takes just a few seconds and immediately initiate the re-integration process.
If another error is detected in the same board shortly thereafter, a more thorough POST program
can be executed to see if there are any permanent defects. The re-integration time for the global
memory varies with workload but it can be reduced by increasing the priority of the re-integration
process. In this experiment, simulations axe conducted with POST times of 1, 10, 30 and 60 seconds
with the global memory re-integrations times listed in table 5 to determine their impact on system
MTBF. Scrubbing was not activated.
Figure 21a plots the MTBF figures for the various POST times for small latent errors with error
arrival rate A1. With a 30 second global memory re-integration time, reducing the POST time from
60 seconds to 1 second improves the MTBF from approximately 20 years to 50 years. However,
when the global memory re-integration time is increased to 2 minutes, reducing POST times has
no effect on system MTBF. According to table 2, global memory re-integration time for a 32Mbyte
system is 2 minutes when the system is working at hag capacity. Clearly, given the assumption
that 62% s of all errors are injected into the global memory, the "reliability bottleneck" is the large
re-integration time of the global memory. Rather than trying to reduce CPU POST times, the
designers should focus their efforts on reducing global memory re-integration times.
The results of simulations where correlated errors are injected are shown in figure 2lb. For
these simulations, the global memory's re-integration time was kept fixed at 30 seconds. Again,
in this experiment we see that the presence of correlated errors diminishes any gains achieved by
reducing the CPU POST times.
6This number was determined based on the size of the global memory _nd the CPU local memories. See section
4.3.2.
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Figure 21: System reliability for various subsystem re-integration times.
6.5 Impact of the I/O Subsystem
In this experiment, the I/0 subsystem is included in the simulation to determine its impact on
system reliability. The I/O subsystem was injected with errors based on an exponential distribution
with the means listed in table 5. For a given error arrival rate, 5% were injected into the IOPs,
34% into the controllers, 60% were injected as recoverable disk errors and 1% as major disk errors.
Figure 22 shows the results of simulations with a POST time of 60 seconds, a global memory
re-integration time of 2 minutes and A1 as the combined error arrival rate for the CPU and the
global memory. The figure shows that the original "without I/0" MTBF figure are not reached
until the I/O error arrival rate is slightly slower than A1. Most of the I/O failures were due to
controller failures which in turn caused disk mirroring to be lost. Since it takes 20 minutes to
re-mirror a disk, a controller failure creates a large window of vulnerability for the system. The
I/O subsystem is the reliability bottleneck until the I/O error arrival rate falls to less than 2 errors
a day (figure 22b).
7 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to introduce DEPEND and demonstrate its capabilities and its
utility with a real example. The paper described the unique object-oriented approach used by
DEPEND to provide a flexible framework which can model various fault-tolerant architectures.
It also demonstrated how the tool can facilitate the evaluation of a complete system and help to
conduct extensive fault-injection experiments with minimal effort.
The key features of DEPEND were illustrated by analyzing the Tandem Integrity fault-tolerant
system. Specifically, the effect of near-coincident errors caused by correlated and latent faults was
analyzed. Issues such as memory scrubbing, re-integration policies and workload dependent repair
times, which affect how the system handles near-coincident errors were also evaluated. Other issues
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such as the simulation of error latency and the time acceleration technique that provides significant
simulation speed up were discussed.
Results obtained using DEPEND were validated by comparing with measurements obtained
from fault injection experiments conducted on a production Tandem Integrity system. A hybrid
monitoring testbed was used to conduct the injection experiments. The measured error latency
distribution for a workload consisting of two Gaussian elimination programs was found to fit a
hyperexponential distribution. The mean latency time was found to vary significantly depending
on the size of the matrix being solved. The results of the validation experiments demonstrated that
DEPEND is capable of capturing the intricacies of a real system. The results also verified that the
technique used to simulate error latency adequately represents the workload and the dynamically
changing system and user activity so that precise computation of dependability measures can be
obtained.
The simulation model was used to inject near-coincident errors and evaluate the behavior of
the Integrity system. Results from the fault injection study clearly showed that there is substan-
tim degradation in system reliability due to transient, correlated errors. Even correlated errors
with large latencies (larger latencies reduce the probability that a pair of correlated errors will
be detected simultaneously or near-coincidentally) were found to significantly impair system reli-
ability and diminish much of the benefit derived from reliability improvement strategies such as
memory scrubbing and reducing re-integration times. Several re-integration schemes were modeled
and found to behave similarly. Experiments in _vhich various CPU and workload dependent global
memory re-integration times were tried revealed that if the machine is working at half its capacity,
the global memory re-integration time is the reliability bottleneck and that designers should try to
reduce this time rather than CPU re-integration times. The weak point of the I/O subsystem is
the time needed to mirror a disk, coupled with the fact that a faulty controller causes all the disks
attached to it to be inaccessible thus losing disk mirroring.
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9 Appendix
The probabilityof 2 or 3 activecorrelatederrors(P[ACTERR]) is computedasfollows:
P[ACTERR] = P[CR] x (P[2AEI2EI ] • P[2EI] + P[23AEI3EI ] • P[3EI]) (1)
where
• P[CR] is the probability of a correlated error.
• P[2AE] is the probability of 2 active errors.
• P[2EI] is the probability that there are 2 correlated errors given that this is a correlated
error.
• P[23AE] is the probability of 2 or 3 active errors.
• P[3EI] is the probability that there are 3 correlated errors given that this is a correlated
error.
P[2AEI2EI] = 0.152 (2)
P[23AEI3EI] = 0.15 3 + 0.152 X 0.85 X 3 (3)
Here, P[CR] is simply the percent of correlated errors and is either 0, 0.01 or 0.02 and P[2EI] =
P[3EI] = 0.5. The maximum MTBF is then:
1
MTBF,_,,xi,,,,,rn = P[ACTERR] x AePu (4)
where )_cPU is the error arrival rate of the processor subsystem.
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